Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Inspector General



# Compendium of Open Recommendations

March 1, 2021

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## ABBREVIATIONS .....

| DER         | Division of Enterprise Regulation                          |
|-------------|--|
| Enterprises | Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac                                 |
| FHFA        | Federal Housing Finance Agency                             |
| MRA         | Matter Requiring Attention                                 |
| OIG         | Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Inspector General |
| PII         | Personally Identifiable Information                        |
| ROE         | Report of Examination                                      |

## INTRODUCTION .....

Since the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) began operations in October 2010, we have made more than 475 recommendations<sup>1</sup> to improve efficiency and effectiveness and reduce fraud, waste, and abuse at FHFA and at the government-sponsored enterprises for which the Agency acts as conservator and regulator, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the Enterprises), and at the Federal Home Loan Banks for which the Agency acts as regulator. As required under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, we provide information on open and closed recommendations in each semiannual report to the Congress.<sup>2</sup>

To maintain the focus on opportunities for improvement that our recommendations identify, OIG publishes on its website a monthly report setting forth all open recommendations from our audits, evaluations, and other studies.<sup>3</sup> For additional information on any recommendation, please click on the hyperlinked report number to access its underlying report. This compendium is comprehensive as of March 1, 2021.

Because FHFA serves a unique role as both conservator and regulator of the Enterprises, OIG's responsibilities necessarily include oversight of FHFA's actions in both of these roles, in order to determine whether the Agency is fulfilling its statutory duties and responsibilities and safeguarding the taxpayers' resources. Our oversight role also reaches the Enterprises recipients of \$191.5 billion in taxpayer monies—to ensure that they are satisfying their obligations under the authority delegated to them in the conservatorships. Through oversight, transparent reporting of results, and robust enforcement, OIG seeks to be a voice for, and protect the interest of, those who have funded Treasury's investment in the Enterprises—the American taxpayers.

#### **Tracking of OIG Recommendations**

Our recommendations, like those of other inspectors general, are primarily made in written reports issued by our Offices of Audits, Evaluations, and Compliance. We report the facts, as found, and recommend actions to address any shortcomings we identify in FHFA's exercise of its statutory duties and responsibilities or by one or both Enterprises, in connection with their execution of responsibilities delegated to them by FHFA, as conservator. FHFA is provided an opportunity to provide a written response to OIG recommendations. FHFA's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Includes public and non-public recommendations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> OIG's semiannual reports are available at <u>www.fhfaoig.gov/Reports/Semiannual</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> This report does not include recommendations under consideration for work that is in progress.

determinations whether to agree with OIG's recommendations are included in our published reports. Once FHFA has accepted an OIG recommendation, it reports to us on its efforts to implement the "corrective action" that is intended to respond to the recommendation. When FHFA believes that its implementation efforts are well underway or that implementation is complete, FHFA provides that information to us, along with corroborating documents, and we rely on those materials in determining whether to close recommendations. If the Agency rejects a recommendation or conclusively refuses to implement an acceptable corrective action, then we will close the recommendation and report it separately in this compendium.

#### **Validation Testing**

OIG typically relies on materials and representations from the Agency to close its recommendations and may close some recommendations based on the Agency's representations as to the corrective actions it has taken. Accordingly, we are not always able to assess, at the time of closure, whether the implementation actions by FHFA meet the letter and spirit of the agreed-upon recommendation, nor can we determine, at closure, the longer-term impact of the recommendation. To better assess both the implementation and impact of OIG recommendations, we concluded that validation testing is needed. Such testing, and disclosure of results of that testing, provides greater accountability and adds value to FHFA and the American taxpayers it serves.

Because our Offices of Audits and Evaluations historically had not conducted extensive corrective action verification testing, we created the Office of Compliance and Special Projects. The primary operational role of that office is to examine closed recommendations to assess independently FHFA's implementation of the corrective actions it represented to OIG that it intended to take, as well as the impact of those actions, and to publish reports of its validation testing in "compliance reviews." These compliance reviews enable our stakeholders to assess the impact of OIG's recommendations, as well as the efficacy of the Agency's implementation of those recommendations. Compliance reviews enhance OIG's ability to stimulate positive change in critical areas and promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness at FHFA.

Any open recommendations contained in published compliance reviews are included in this compendium.

### OPEN RECOMMENDATIONS .....

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated | Recommendation  | Expected Impact    | Report Name and<br>Date   |
|----------------------------------|---|--------------------|---|
|                                  | Open Recommendation   | ns                 |   |
|                                  | Conservatorship: Delegated Res  | ponsibilities      |   |
| Conflicts of Interest            | FHFA should direct FHFA employees to<br>monitor the review and resolution of Senior<br>Executive Officer disclosures of potential,<br>actual, or apparent conflicts of interest to<br>ensure that revised Board committee<br>charter(s) and management policies and<br>procedures are being followed. | Improved oversight | Corporate<br>Governance:<br>Review and<br>Resolution of<br>Conflicts of Interest<br>Involving Fannie<br>Mae's Senior<br>Executive Officers<br>Highlight the Need<br>for Closer Attention<br>to Governance<br>Issues by FHFA<br>(EVL-2018-001,<br>January 31, 2018) <sup>4</sup> |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> This recommendation is being held open pending the completion of a related 2020 FHFA planned supervisory activity, and OIG's assessment of that supervisory activity.

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated | Recommendation   | Expected Impact    | Report Name and<br>Date   |
|----------------------------------|--|--------------------|---|
|                                  | FHFA, as conservator, should direct Freddie<br>Mac to revise its policies and procedures to<br>align with the responsibilities assigned to<br>the Nominating and Governance Committee<br>and facilitate the Nominating and<br>Governance Committee's execution of its<br>responsibilities. [Closed in July 2018;<br>reopened upon results of compliance<br>testing.] | Improved oversight | Management Alert:<br>Need for Increased<br>Oversight by FHFA,<br>as Conservator, to<br>Ensure that Freddie<br>Mac's Policies and<br>Procedures for<br>Resolution of<br>Executive Officer<br>Conflicts of Interest<br>Align with the<br>Responsibilities of<br>the Nominating<br>and Governance<br>Committee of the<br>Freddie Mac Board<br>of Directors (OIG-<br>2017-005,<br>September 27,<br>2017) and Freddie<br>Mac Management<br>Failed to Adopt and<br>Implement<br>Conflicts of Interest<br>Policies Which<br>Aligned Fully with<br>FHFA's Directive on<br>Senior Executive<br>Officers' Conflicts<br>of Interest, and<br>With the Charter for<br>the Freddie Mac<br>Board's<br>Nominating and<br>Governance<br>Committee (COM-<br>2020-006, August<br>26, 2020) |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated | Recommendation   | Expected Impact      | Report Name and<br>Date  |
|----------------------------------|--|----------------------|--|
|                                  | Supervision  |                      |  |
| Examiner Capacity                | FHFA should develop a process that links<br>annual Enterprise examination plans with<br>core team resource requirements. | Improved supervision | Update on FHFA's<br>Efforts to<br>Strengthen its<br>Capacity to Examine<br>the Enterprises<br>(EVL-2014-002,<br>December 19,<br>2013) and Despite<br>Prior<br>Commitments,<br>FHFA Has Not<br>Implemented a<br>Systematic<br>Workforce Planning<br>Process to<br>Determine Whether<br>Enough Qualified<br>Examiners are<br>Available to Assess<br>the Safety and<br>Soundness of<br>Fannie Mae and<br>Freddie Mac (AUD-<br>2020-004,<br>February 25, 2020) |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated | Recommendation   | Expected Impact      | Report Name and<br>Date   |
|----------------------------------|--|----------------------|---|
|                                  | FHFA should establish a strategy to ensure<br>that the necessary resources are in place to<br>ensure timely and effective Enterprise<br>examination oversight.   | Improved supervision | Update on FHFA's<br>Efforts to<br>Strengthen its<br>Capacity to<br>Examine the<br>Enterprises<br>(EVL-2014-002,<br>December 19,<br>2013) and Despite<br>Prior<br>Commitments,<br>FHFA Has Not<br>Implemented a<br>Systematic<br>Workforce Planning<br>Process to<br>Determine Whether<br>Enough Qualified<br>Examiners are<br>Available to Assess<br>the Safety and<br>Soundness of<br>Fannie Mae and<br>Freddie Mac (AUD-<br>2020-004,<br>February 25, 2020) |
|                                  | FHFA should assess whether the Division of<br>Enterprise Regulation (DER) has a sufficient<br>complement of qualified examiners to<br>conduct and complete those examinations<br>rated by DER to be of high-priority within<br>each supervisory cycle and address the<br>resource constraints that have adversely<br>affected DER's ability to carry out its risk-<br>based supervisory plans. | Improved supervision | FHFA Failed to<br>Complete Non-MRA<br>Supervisory<br>Activities Related to<br>Cybersecurity Risks<br>at Fannie Mae<br>Planned for the<br>2016 Examination<br>Cycle (AUD-2017-<br>010, September<br>27, 2017)  |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated | Recommendation  | Expected Impact      | Report Name and<br>Date   |
|----------------------------------|---|----------------------|---|
|                                  | FHFA should assess whether DER has a<br>sufficient complement of qualified<br>examiners to conduct and complete those<br>examinations rated by DER to be of high-<br>priority within each supervisory cycle and<br>address the resource constraints that have<br>adversely affected DER's ability to carry out<br>its risk-based supervisory plans. | Improved supervision | FHFA's Targeted<br>Examinations of<br>Freddie Mac: Just<br>Over Half of the<br>Targeted<br>Examinations<br>Planned for 2012<br>through 2015 Were<br>Completed (AUD-<br>2016-007,<br>September 30,<br>2016); FHFA's<br>Targeted<br>Examinations of<br>Fannie Mae: Less<br>than Half of the<br>Targeted<br>Examinations<br>Planned for 2012<br>through 2015 Were<br>Completed and No<br>Examinations<br>Planned for 2015<br>Were Completed<br>Before the Report<br>of Examination<br>Issued (AUD-2016-<br>006, September<br>30, 2016) |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated | Recommendation   | Expected Impact      | Report Name and<br>Date   |
|----------------------------------|--|----------------------|---|
|                                  | <ul> <li>FHFA should direct DER to develop and implement a systematic workforce planning process within 12 months that aligns with Office of Personnel Management guidance and best practices and is fully documented in writing. That process should include:</li> <li>Identifying the current examination skills and competencies of its examiners;</li> <li>Forecasting the optimal staffing levels and competencies needed to meet its supervisory needs;</li> <li>Evaluating whether a gap exists between skills that its workforce may currently need but does not possess; and</li> <li>Addressing that gap.</li> </ul> | Improved supervision | Despite Prior<br>Commitments,<br>FHFA Has Not<br>Implemented a<br>Systematic<br>Workforce Planning<br>Process to<br>Determine Whether<br>Enough Qualified<br>Examiners are<br>Available to Assess<br>the Safety and<br>Soundness of<br>Fannie Mae and<br>Freddie Mac (AUD-<br>2020-004,<br>February 25,<br>2020) <sup>5</sup> |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In its management response to this audit, FHFA stated it would assess the report's recommendation and provide a response by June 30, 2020. On September 22, 2020, we reposted this report with an Addendum that provides FHFA's June 30, 2020, response and related communications. In summary, FHFA has planned an alternative approach that meets the intent of the recommendation. Implementation of this alternative approach may also address the open, unimplemented recommendations related to the sufficiency of DER's examiner workforce in EVL-2014-002, AUD-2016-006, AUD-2016-007, AUD-2017-010, and EVL-2020-001.

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated | Recommendation   | Expected Impact      | Report Name and Date  |
|----------------------------------|--|----------------------|---|
|                                  | <ul> <li>FHFA should direct DER to develop and implement a systematic workforce planning process within 12 months that aligns with Office of Personnel Management guidance and best practices and is fully documented. That process should include:</li> <li>Identifying the appropriate number of Enterprise high-risk models to be examined each year through targeted examinations;</li> <li>Identifying the current examination skills and competencies of examiners engaged in supervisory activities of high-risk models;</li> <li>Forecasting the optimal staffing levels and competencies of examiners necessary to complete the identified number of targeted examination cycle;</li> <li>Evaluating whether a gap exists between skills required to conduct supervision of high-risk models that its examiners currently need but do not possess; and</li> <li>Addressing that gap.</li> </ul> | Improved supervision | Despite FHFA's<br>Recognition of<br>Significant Risks<br>Associated with<br>Fannie Mae's and<br>Freddie Mac's<br>High-Risk Models,<br>its Examination of<br>Those Models Over<br>a Six Year Period<br>Has Been Neither<br>Rigorous nor Timely<br>(EVL-2020-001,<br>March 25, 2020) <sup>6</sup> |
|                                  | Based on the results of its workforce<br>analysis, FHFA should conduct a written<br>assessment of whether DER's current<br>budget for its supervision of high-risk<br>models is sufficient.  | Improved supervision | Despite FHFA's<br>Recognition of<br>Significant Risks<br>Associated with<br>Fannie Mae's and<br>Freddie Mac's<br>High-Risk Models,<br>its Examination of<br>Those Models Over<br>a Six Year Period<br>Has Been Neither<br>Rigorous nor Timely<br>(EVL-2020-001,<br>March 25, 2020) <sup>7</sup> |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> In its management response to this evaluation, FHFA stated it would assess the report's recommendations and provide a response by June 30, 2020. On September 22, 2020, we reposted this report with an Addendum that provides FHFA's June 30, 2020, response and related communications. In summary, FHFA has planned an alternative approach that is generally responsive to the recommendations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See prior footnote.

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated                | Recommendation   | Expected Impact      | Report Name and<br>Date   |
|---|--|----------------------|---|
| Accreditation of<br>Examiners                   | FHFA should determine the causes of the<br>shortfalls in the Housing Finance Examiner<br>Commission Program that we have<br>identified, and implement a strategy to<br>ensure the program fulfills its central<br>objective of producing commissioned<br>examiners who are qualified to lead major<br>risk sections of government-sponsored<br>enterprise examinations.  | Improved quality     | OlG's Compliance<br>Review of FHFA's<br>Implementation of<br>Its Housing Finance<br>Examiner<br>Commission<br>Program<br>(COM-2015-001,<br>July 29, 2015) and<br>FHFA's Housing<br>Finance Examiner<br>Commissioning<br>Program: \$7.7<br>Million and Four<br>Years into the<br>Program, the<br>Agency has Fewer<br>Commissioned<br>Examiners (COM-<br>2018-006,<br>September 6,<br>2018) <sup>8</sup>                  |
| Risk Assessments<br>for Supervisory<br>Planning | <ul> <li>FHFA should reinforce, through training and supervision of DER personnel, the requirements established by FHFA, and reinforced by DER guidance, for the risk assessment and supervisory planning process. Specifically:</li> <li>a. Ensure that the annual supervisory strategy identifies significant risks and supervisory concerns and explains how the planned supervisory activities to be conducted during the examination cycle address the most significant risks in the operational risk assessment. (Applies to AUD-2017-010 and AUD-2017-011)</li> <li>b. Ensure that supervisory activities planned during an examination cycle to address the most significant risks in the operational risk assessment are completed within the examination cycle. (Applies to AUD-2017-010)</li> </ul> | Improved supervision | FHFA Failed to<br>Complete Non-MRA<br>Supervisory<br>Activities Related to<br>Cybersecurity Risks<br>at Fannie Mae<br>Planned for the<br>2016 Examination<br>Cycle (AUD-2017-<br>010, September<br>27, 2017); FHFA<br>Did Not Complete<br>All Planned<br>Supervisory<br>Activities Related to<br>Cybersecurity Risks<br>at Freddie Mac for<br>the 2016<br>Examination Cycle<br>(AUD-2017-011,<br>September 27,<br>2017) |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> OIG has twice determined that the Housing Finance Examiner Commission Program was not on track to produce commissioned examiners. This recommendation is open pending FHFA actions to assess and address the Program's shortfalls, and OIG's assessment of those corrective actions.

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated                         | Recommendation   | Expected Impact                         | Report Name and<br>Date  |
|--|--|---|--|
| Mitigated<br>Assessing<br>Remediation of<br>Deficiencies | FHFA should ensure that Freddie Mac<br>takes, or has taken, remedial action to<br>address the deficiency underlying the<br>matter requiring attention (MRA) regarding<br>the need to implement a process to verify<br>and monitor [certain matters].   | Improved remediation<br>of deficiencies | FHFA Failed to<br>Ensure Freddie<br>Mac's Remedial<br>Plans for a<br>Cybersecurity MRA<br>Addressed All<br>Deficiencies; as<br>Allowed by its<br>Standard, FHFA<br>Closed the MRA<br>after Independently<br>Determining the<br>Enterprise<br>Completed its<br>Planned Remedial<br>Actions (AUD-2018-<br>008, March 28,<br>2018) <sup>9</sup>   |
|  | FHFA should require DER, upon acceptance<br>of an Enterprise's remediation plan, to<br>estimate the date by which it expects to<br>confirm internal audit's validation, and to<br>enter that date into a dedicated field in the<br>MRA tracking system. [Closed in<br>September 2017; reopened upon results of<br>compliance testing.] | Improved remediation<br>of deficiencies | FHFA's Inconsistent<br>Practices in<br>Assessing<br>Enterprise<br>Remediation of<br>Serious<br>Deficiencies and<br>Weaknesses in its<br>Tracking Systems<br>Limit the<br>Effectiveness of<br>FHFA's Supervision<br>of the Enterprises<br>(EVL-2016-007,<br>July 14, 2016) and<br>Compliance Review<br>of the Timeliness of<br>FHFA's<br>Assessments of the<br>Enterprises'<br>Remediation<br>Closure Packages<br>for a Matter<br>Requiring Attention<br>(COM-2020-001,<br>February 21, 2020) |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> This recommendation is being held open pending the completion of a 2020 FHFA planned supervisory activity related to the underlying deficiency of the MRA that was the subject of this report, and OIG's assessment of that supervisory activity.

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated | Recommendation  | Expected Impact      | Report Name and<br>Date   |
|----------------------------------|---|----------------------|---|
| Supervisory<br>Oversight         | FHFA should determine the appropriate<br>threshold or criteria for charging off<br>delinquent single-family loans at the<br>Enterprises and communicate that<br>threshold or criteria through revised or new<br>Agency guidance.  | Improved supervision | More than Eight<br>Years After Issuing<br>its Advisory<br>Bulletin, FHFA Has<br>Not Held the<br>Enterprises to its<br>Expectations on<br>Charging off<br>Delinquent Loans<br>or Communicated<br>New Expectations<br>(EVL-2020-003,<br>September 10,<br>2020)                            |
|                                  | FHFA should assess the Enterprises'<br>implementation of the revised or new<br>Agency guidance to ensure that the<br>Enterprises' practices comport with FHFA's<br>supervisory expectations.  | Improved supervision | More than Eight<br>Years After Issuing<br>its Advisory<br>Bulletin, FHFA Has<br>Not Held the<br>Enterprises to its<br>Expectations on<br>Charging off<br>Delinquent Loans<br>or Communicated<br>New Expectations<br>(EVL-2020-003,<br>September 10,<br>2020)                            |
|                                  | FHFA should ensure that the Office of<br>Housing and Regulatory Policy (a) develops<br>and issues written guidance to the<br>Enterprises on the data elements to be<br>reported regularly for FHFA's monitoring of<br>the 97% LTV mortgage programs and (b)<br>establishes quality control procedures to<br>ensure that information reported by the<br>Enterprises is reliable and conforms to the<br>requirements of the written guidance. | Improved supervision | Weaknesses in<br>FHFA's Monitoring<br>of the Enterprises'<br>97% LTV Mortgage<br>Programs May<br>Hinder FHFA's<br>Ability to Timely<br>Identify, Analyze,<br>and Respond to<br>Risks Related to<br>Achieving the<br>Programs'<br>Objectives<br>(AUD-2020-014,<br>September 29,<br>2020) |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated                            | Recommendation  | Expected Impact                   | Report Name and<br>Date   |
|---|---|-----------------------------------|---|
|   | FHFA should clarify and reinforce the Office<br>of Housing and Regulatory Policy's guidance<br>regarding the frequency of 97% LTV<br>mortgage program monitoring dashboard<br>preparation to Office of Housing and<br>Regulatory Policy staff and ensure that the<br>monitoring dashboards are prepared and<br>reviewed in accordance with that guidance. | Improved supervision              | Weaknesses in<br>FHFA's Monitoring<br>of the Enterprises'<br>97% LTV Mortgage<br>Programs May<br>Hinder FHFA's<br>Ability to Timely<br>Identify, Analyze,<br>and Respond to<br>Risks Related to<br>Achieving the<br>Programs'<br>Objectives<br>(AUD-2020-014,<br>September 29,<br>2020) |
| Examiner<br>Assessment and<br>Escalation of<br>Shortcomings | FHFA should assess whether Fannie Mae's remediation of its [redacted] is sufficient.  | Improved supervisory<br>oversight | FHFA Examiners'<br>Lack of<br>Assessment and<br>Escalation of<br>Shortcomings<br>Identified by an<br>Enterprise in its<br>Servicer Fraud Risk<br>Management<br>Framework Limited<br>the Agency's<br>Supervisory<br>Oversight (EVL-<br>2020-002, August<br>27, 2020)                     |
|   | FHFA should set clear expectations in<br>supervisory guidance for prompt escalation<br>within DER by examiners of information<br>regarding deficient practices at an<br>Enterprise for a determination of whether<br>such practices warrant additional<br>supervisory attention and/or should be the<br>subject of an adverse examination finding.        | Improved supervisory<br>oversight | FHFA Examiners'<br>Lack of<br>Assessment and<br>Escalation of<br>Shortcomings<br>Identified by an<br>Enterprise in its<br>Servicer Fraud Risk<br>Management<br>Framework Limited<br>the Agency's<br>Supervisory<br>Oversight (EVL-<br>2020-002, August<br>27, 2020)                     |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated | Recommendation  | Expected Impact                   | Report Name and<br>Date   |
|----------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|---|
| ŭ                                | FHFA should reinforce in examiner training<br>and the annual performance appraisal<br>process its expectations for collaboration<br>among examiners, communication of<br>potential deficient practices to DER<br>managers, and documentation of support<br>for conclusions. | Improved supervisory<br>oversight | FHFA Examiners'<br>Lack of<br>Assessment and<br>Escalation of<br>Shortcomings<br>Identified by an<br>Enterprise in its<br>Servicer Fraud Risk<br>Management<br>Framework Limited<br>the Agency's<br>Supervisory<br>Oversight ( <u>EVL-</u><br><u>2020-002</u> , August<br>27, 2020) |
| Examination<br>Guidance          | FHFA should establish and implement<br>timelines and processes to ensure timely<br>updates and revisions to DER's examination<br>manual.  | Improved supervision              | Five Years After<br>Issuance, Many<br>Examination<br>Modules Remain in<br>Field Test; FHFA<br>Should Establish<br>Timelines and<br>Processes to<br>Ensure Timely<br>Revision of<br>Examiner Guidance<br>( <u>EVL-2019-003</u> ,<br>September 10,<br>2019)                           |
|                                  | FHFA should establish and communicate<br>clear expectations for use of revised and<br>new examination modules by DER<br>examiners.  | Improved supervision              | Five Years After<br>Issuance, Many<br>Examination<br>Modules Remain in<br>Field Test; FHFA<br>Should Establish<br>Timelines and<br>Processes to<br>Ensure Timely<br>Revision of<br>Examiner Guidance<br>(EVL-2019-003,<br>September 10,<br>2019)                                    |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated | Recommendation  | Expected Impact      | Report Name and<br>Date  |
|----------------------------------|---|----------------------|--|
|                                  | FHFA should reinforce the requirement to<br>examiners in charge and examination<br>managers that changes to an examination<br>plan must be risk-based – changes in<br>Enterprise business operations or risk<br>exposures – and that resource constraints<br>are not accepted reasons for such changes. | Improved supervision | FHFA Completed<br>Most of its Planned<br>Ongoing Monitoring<br>Activities for Fannie<br>Mae and CSS for<br>2019; However,<br>FHFA Failed to<br>Follow its<br>Requirements<br>When it Changed<br>Examination Plans<br>for Non-Risk-Based<br>Reasons and Failed<br>to Obtain Deputy<br>Director Approval<br>( <u>AUD-2020-011</u> ,<br>September 9,<br>2020) |
|                                  | FHFA should reinforce the requirement that<br>any revisions to an examination plan must<br>be approved in writing by the Deputy<br>Director.  | Improved supervision | FHFA Completed<br>Most of its Planned<br>Ongoing Monitoring<br>Activities for Fannie<br>Mae and CSS for<br>2019; However,<br>FHFA Failed to<br>Follow its<br>Requirements<br>When it Changed<br>Examination Plans<br>for Non-Risk-Based<br>Reasons and Failed<br>to Obtain Deputy<br>Director Approval<br>(AUD-2020-011,<br>September 9,<br>2020)          |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated                       | Recommendation   | Expected Impact             | Report Name and Date   |
|--|--|-----------------------------|--|
| Effective<br>Cybersecurity<br>Controls<br>Examinations | FHFA should require examiners to<br>document their assessment of the design of<br>the Federal Home Loan Banks' vulnerability<br>scans and penetration tests as part of their<br>assessment of the operational<br>effectiveness of such controls. [Closed in<br>February 2017; reopened upon results of<br>compliance testing.] | Improved examinations       | FHFA Should<br>Improve its<br>Examinations of<br>the Effectiveness of<br>the Federal Home<br>Loan Banks' Cyber<br>Risk Management<br>Programs by<br>Including an<br>Assessment of the<br>Design of Critical<br>Internal Controls<br>(AUD-2016-001,<br>February 29, 2016)<br>and Compliance<br>Review of DBR's<br>Examinations of<br>Critical<br>Cybersecurity<br>Controls at the<br>Federal Home Loan<br>Banks (COM-2019-<br>004, May 7, 2019) |
| Quality Control<br>Reviews                             | FHFA's Office of Minority and Women<br>Inclusion should ensure that quality control<br>reviews are performed before issuing<br>diversity and inclusion examination findings<br>to a regulated entity, as required by<br>Supervision Directive 2017-01.   | Improved quality            | Compliance Review<br>of FHFA's Office of<br>Minority and<br>Women Inclusion<br>( <u>COM-2019-005</u> ,<br>June 24, 2019)   |
|  | Information Technolog  | У                           |  |
| Information<br>Technology Risk<br>Examinations         | FHFA should comply with Financial Stability<br>Oversight Council recommendations to<br>address the gaps, as prioritized, to reflect<br>and incorporate appropriate elements of<br>the National Institute of Standards and<br>Technology Framework.   | Improved risk<br>management | FHFA Should Map<br>Its Supervisory<br>Standards for<br>Cyber Risk<br>Management to<br>Appropriate<br>Elements of the<br>NIST Framework<br>(EVL-2016-003,<br>March 28, 2016) <sup>10</sup>  |

 $<sup>^{10}</sup>$  FHFA revised its supervisory guidance related to information security and risk management in March 2020. OIG is reviewing the revised guidance to assess whether FHFA has adequately addressed this recommendation.

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated                            | Recommendation   | Expected Impact                            | Report Name and<br>Date   |
|---|--|--|---|
|   | FHFA should comply with Financial Stability<br>Oversight Council recommendations to<br>revise existing regulatory guidance to reflect<br>and incorporate appropriate elements of<br>the National Institute of Standards and<br>Technology framework in a manner that<br>achieves consistency with other federal<br>financial regulators. | Improved risk<br>management                | FHFA Should Map<br>Its Supervisory<br>Standards for<br>Cyber Risk<br>Management to<br>Appropriate<br>Elements of the<br>NIST Framework<br>(EVL-2016-003,<br>March 28, 2016) <sup>11</sup> |
| Privacy Information<br>and Data Protection                  | FHFA should determine privacy controls that are information system-specific, and/or hybrid controls.   | Improved protection of privacy information | Audit of the Federal<br>Housing Finance<br>Agency's 2019<br>Privacy Program<br>( <u>AUD-2019-009</u> ,<br>August 28, 2019)  |
|   | FHFA should document privacy controls<br>within each system's system security plan<br>or system-specific privacy plan, clearly<br>identifying whether controls are program<br>level, common, information system-specific,<br>or hybrid.  | Improved protection of privacy information | Audit of the Federal<br>Housing Finance<br>Agency's 2019<br>Privacy Program<br>( <u>AUD-2019-009</u> ,<br>August 28, 2019)  |
| FHFA Information<br>Technology Security<br>and Availability | Because information in this report could be<br>used to circumvent FHFA's internal controls,<br>it has not been released publicly.  | Improved information<br>security           | Audit of the Federal<br>Housing Finance<br>Agency's<br>Information<br>Security Program<br>Fiscal Year 2019<br>(AUD-2020-001,<br>October 25, 2019)   |
|   | Because information in this report could be<br>used to circumvent FHFA's internal controls,<br>it has not been released publicly.  | Improved information<br>security           | Audit of the Federal<br>Housing Finance<br>Agency's<br>Information<br>Security Program<br>Fiscal Year 2020<br>(AUD-2021-001,<br>October 20, 2020)   |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> See prior footnote.

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated | Recommendation  | Expected Impact                  | Report Name and<br>Date  |
|----------------------------------|---|----------------------------------|--|
|                                  | Because information in this report could be<br>used to circumvent FHFA's internal controls,<br>it has not been released publicly. | Improved information<br>security | Audit of the Federal<br>Housing Finance<br>Agency's<br>Information<br>Security Program<br>Fiscal Year 2020<br>(AUD-2021-001,<br>October 20, 2020)          |
|                                  | Because information in this report could be<br>used to circumvent FHFA's internal controls,<br>it has not been released publicly. | Improved information<br>security | Audit of the Federal<br>Housing Finance<br>Agency's<br>Information<br>Security Program<br>Fiscal Year 2020<br>(AUD-2021-001,<br>October 20, 2020)          |
|                                  | Because information in this report could be<br>used to circumvent FHFA's internal controls,<br>it has not been released publicly. | Improved information<br>security | Audit of the Federal<br>Housing Finance<br>Agency's<br>Information<br>Security Program<br>Fiscal Year 2020<br>(AUD-2021-001,<br>October 20, 2020)          |
|                                  | Because information in this report could be<br>used to circumvent FHFA's internal controls,<br>it has not been released publicly. | Improved information<br>security | Audit of the Federal<br>Housing Finance<br>Agency's<br>Information<br>Security Program<br>Fiscal Year 2020<br>( <u>AUD-2021-001</u> ,<br>October 20, 2020) |
|                                  | Because information in this report could be<br>used to circumvent FHFA's internal controls,<br>it has not been released publicly. | Improved information<br>security | Audit of the Federal<br>Housing Finance<br>Agency's<br>Information<br>Security Program<br>Fiscal Year 2020<br>( <u>AUD-2021-001</u> ,<br>October 20, 2020) |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated | Recommendation  | Expected Impact                  | Report Name and<br>Date  |
|----------------------------------|---|----------------------------------|--|
|                                  | Because information in this report could be<br>used to circumvent FHFA's internal controls,<br>it has not been released publicly.   | Improved information<br>security | Audit of the Federal<br>Housing Finance<br>Agency's<br>Information<br>Security Program<br>Fiscal Year 2020<br>( <u>AUD-2021-001</u> ,<br>October 20, 2020)   |
|                                  | FHFA should ensure that outdated<br>[redacted] and [redacted] protocols in<br>FHFA's systems are disabled or upgraded in<br>a timely manner in accordance with<br>National Institute of Standards and<br>Technology directives.   | Improved information<br>security | 2019 Internal<br>Penetration Test of<br>FHFA's Network<br>and Systems ( <u>AUD-<br/>2019-014</u> ,<br>September 24,<br>2019)   |
|                                  | <ul> <li>FHFA should review, revise, and implement its procedures for disposal of electronic media targeted for destruction, consistent with National Institute of Standards and Technology and Green Book requirements. Those revised procedures should:</li> <li>Prescribe the expectations for sanitization of the targeted electronic media consistent with National Institute of Standards and Technology guidance;</li> <li>Provide for tracking the targeted electronic media in an inventory system of record;</li> <li>Provide for regular physical inventory of the targeted electronic media and reconciliation to the control record(s) through destruction; and</li> <li>Provide for accountability of the targeted electronic media is taken out of service through its destruction, with reconciliations of any count differences that may arise as the media is transferred within FHFA, and from FHFA to other parties used to destroy the media.</li> </ul> | Improved information security    | FHFA Cannot<br>Assure that All<br>Electronic Media<br>Approved for<br>Destruction in<br>October 2018 Was<br>Destroyed, and it<br>Continues to Lack<br>Adequate Controls<br>over Electronic<br>Media Targeted for<br>Disposal (AUD-<br>2020-009, March<br>30, 2020) |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated | Recommendation   | Expected Impact                                 | Report Name and<br>Date   |
|----------------------------------|--|---|---|
|                                  | FHFA should update its General Support<br>System Disaster Recovery Procedures to<br>ensure the procedures include all National<br>Institute of Standards and Technology-<br>required information and is in a ready state.<br>In this regard, the procedures should<br>provide time periods for the Recovery Time<br>Objective and Recovery Point Objective for<br>resumption of General Support System<br>operation; procedures used to test for the<br>failover and failback of FHFA's Voice over<br>Internet Protocol; lists of equipment needs,<br>vendor names, and emergency contact<br>information; current information on FHFA's<br>alternate operating facility; and current<br>information on individuals and titles listed<br>under assigned roles and responsibilities. | Improved information<br>technology availability | FHFA's 2019<br>Disaster Recovery<br>Exercise of its<br>General Support<br>System Was<br>Conducted as<br>Planned, But its<br>Disaster Recovery<br>Procedures Were<br>Missing Certain<br>Required Elements<br>and Included<br>Outdated<br>Information (AUD-<br>2020-005, March<br>23, 2020) |
|                                  | FHFA should maintain the General Support<br>System Disaster Recovery Procedures in a<br>ready state going forward.   | Improved information<br>technology availability | FHFA's 2019<br>Disaster Recovery<br>Exercise of its<br>General Support<br>System Was<br>Conducted as<br>Planned, But its<br>Disaster Recovery<br>Procedures Were<br>Missing Certain<br>Required Elements<br>and Included<br>Outdated<br>Information (AUD-<br>2020-005, March<br>23, 2020) |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated | Recommendation   | Expected Impact               | Report Name and<br>Date   |
|----------------------------------|--|-------------------------------|---|
|                                  | FHFA should validate the implementation of<br>minimum security requirements for all<br>existing cloud-based General Support<br>System Tools and ensure to do the same for<br>future cloud-based General Support System<br>Tools.                 | Improved information security | FHFA Failed to<br>Follow its Cloud-<br>Based Computing<br>Requirements<br>when it Did Not<br>Validate the<br>Implementation of<br>Minimum Security<br>Requirements for<br>Cloud-Based Tools<br>and Did Not Include<br>Required IT<br>Security Provisions<br>in Some of its<br>Cloud Service<br>Contracts (AUD-<br>2020-013,<br>September 17,<br>2020) |
|                                  | FHFA should modify existing cloud-based<br>General Support System Tool contracts to<br>include the required IT security provisions<br>and ensure future cloud-based General<br>Support System Tool contracts include all<br>required provisions. | Improved information security | FHFA Failed to<br>Follow its Cloud-<br>Based Computing<br>Requirements<br>when it Did Not<br>Validate the<br>Implementation of<br>Minimum Security<br>Requirements for<br>Cloud-Based Tools<br>and Did Not Include<br>Required IT<br>Security Provisions<br>in Some of its<br>Cloud Service<br>Contracts (AUD-<br>2020-013,<br>September 17,<br>2020) |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated  | Recommendation  | Expected Impact                                | Report Name and<br>Date   |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|---|
|                                   | FHFA should reinforce the requirements in<br>the Information System Characterization<br>Methodology to Office of Technology and<br>Information Management Security staff.   | Improved information<br>security               | FHFA Failed to<br>Follow its Cloud-<br>Based Computing<br>Requirements<br>when it Did Not<br>Validate the<br>Implementation of<br>Minimum Security<br>Requirements for<br>Cloud-Based Tools<br>and Did Not Include<br>Required IT<br>Security Provisions<br>in Some of its<br>Cloud Service<br>Contracts (AUD-<br>2020-013,<br>September 17,<br>2020) |
| Oversight of FHFA                 | Agency Operations   | Improved menodoment                            | EHEA Should Name  |
| Workforce Matters                 | FHFA should develop written procedures for<br>carrying out the functions of the Office of<br>the Ombudsman, to include procedures for<br>documenting that all incoming complaints<br>and appeals are tracked, considered, and<br>appropriately resolved. In developing these<br>procedures, the guidance published by the<br>Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen should be<br>taken into consideration.  | Improved management<br>of a statutory function | FHFA Should Name<br>an Ombudsman<br>and Document the<br>Office of the<br>Ombudsman's<br>Procedures (AUD-<br>2019-011,<br>September 16,<br>2019)   |
| Management of<br>Agency Resources | <ul> <li>FHFA should reinforce FHFA's reimbursements and stipends program policies and procedures through a reminder to FHFA staff and supervisors involved in initiating, reviewing, and approving reimbursements and stipends to:</li> <li>Reimburse employees for only eligible job-related expenses with required, supporting documentation,</li> <li>Calculate travel and Examiner-In-Charge stipends correctly, and</li> <li>Maintain properly executed out-stationed employee agreements.</li> </ul> | Prevent improper<br>payments                   | For Fiscal Year<br>2019, FHFA Did<br>Not Always Follow<br>its Policy for<br>Employee<br>Reimbursements<br>and Stipends;<br>FHFA's Practice for<br>Calculating<br>Employee Travel<br>Stipends Was Not<br>Stated in its Policy<br>Nor Consistently<br>Followed (AUD-<br>2020-007, March<br>26, 2020)  |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated | Recommendation   | Expected Impact                | Report Name and Date   |
|----------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|--|
|                                  | FHFA should update FHFA's<br>Reimbursements and Stipends Policy 113<br>to align with management's intent and<br>practice.  | Prevent improper<br>payments   | For Fiscal Year<br>2019, FHFA Did<br>Not Always Follow<br>its Policy for<br>Employee<br>Reimbursements<br>and Stipends;<br>FHFA's Practice for<br>Calculating<br>Employee Travel<br>Stipends Was Not<br>Stated in its Policy<br>Nor Consistently<br>Followed (AUD-<br>2020-007, March<br>26, 2020) |
| Management of<br>Agency Records  | FHFA should ensure its permanent<br>electronic records are located in and<br>retrievable from FHFA's systems in<br>accordance with division and office file<br>plans.  | Improved records<br>management | FHFA Needs to<br>Strengthen<br>Controls Over its<br>Records<br>Management<br>Program to Comply<br>with OMB and<br>NARA<br>Requirements<br>( <u>AUD-2020-008</u> ,<br>March 26, 2020)   |
|                                  | FHFA should direct its Records and<br>Information Management section to work<br>with divisions and offices to review and<br>update their respective file plans. That<br>process should include ensuring the file<br>plans include the location of all records, are<br>complete, and link to National Archives and<br>Records Administration-approved records<br>schedules. | Improved records<br>management | FHFA Needs to<br>Strengthen<br>Controls Over its<br>Records<br>Management<br>Program to Comply<br>with OMB and<br>NARA<br>Requirements<br>( <u>AUD-2020-008</u> ,<br>March 26, 2020)   |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated | Recommendation  | Expected Impact                | Report Name and<br>Date  |
|----------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|--|
|                                  | FHFA should include all National Archives<br>and Records Administration-required<br>content topics in annual records<br>management training provided to FHFA<br>employees and contractor employees. | Improved records<br>management | FHFA Needs to<br>Strengthen<br>Controls Over its<br>Records<br>Management<br>Program to Comply<br>with OMB and<br>NARA<br>Requirements<br>( <u>AUD-2020-008</u> ,<br>March 26, 2020) |

### CLOSED UNIMPLEMENTED RECOMMENDATIONS .....

The Inspector General Act of 1978 does not authorize any federal inspector general to compel its respective agency to adopt new policies or processes or take personnel actions to correct shortcomings found in their audits, evaluations, and investigations. Rather, the Act empowers inspectors general to recommend remedial actions to correct such shortcomings, and the affected agency determines whether or not to accept the recommendations.

We believe it is important to be transparent and distinguish between recommendations that have been closed in light of appropriate movement toward implementation and recommendations that have been closed in light of FHFA's refusal to take any action. For those recommendations closed due to rejection by FHFA, we continue to stand by our findings and believe that the Agency should have undertaken the recommended actions.

The recommendations listed below represent those that have been closed following FHFA's rejection and were not implemented.

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated                          | Recommendation   | Expected Impact   | Report Name and<br>Date  |
|---|--|-------------------|--|
|   | Closed Unimplemented Recomn  | nendations        |  |
| Property Inspection<br>Quality Controls                   | FHFA should direct the Enterprises to<br>establish uniform pre-foreclosure inspection<br>quality standards and quality control<br>processes for inspectors.                                      | Improved quality  | FHFA Oversight of<br>Enterprise Controls<br>Over Pre-<br>Foreclosure<br>Property<br>Inspections (AUD-<br>2014-012, March<br>25, 2014)                                    |
| Improperly<br>Reimbursed<br>Property Inspection<br>Claims | FHFA should direct Fannie Mae to obtain a<br>refund from servicers for improperly<br>reimbursed property inspection claims,<br>resulting in estimated funds put to better<br>use of \$5,015,505. | Improved accuracy | FHFA Oversight of<br>Fannie Mae's<br>Reimbursement<br>Process for Pre-<br>Foreclosure<br>Property<br>Inspections ( <u>AUD-</u><br><u>2014-005</u> , January<br>15, 2014) |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated   | Recommendation   | Expected Impact                  | Report Name and<br>Date  |
|--|--|----------------------------------|--|
| Seller/Servicer<br>Resolution of Aged<br>Repurchase<br>Demands                                 | FHFA should promptly quantify the potential<br>benefit of implementing a repurchase late<br>fee program at Fannie Mae, and then<br>determine whether the potential cost<br>of from \$500,000 to \$5.4 million still<br>outweighs the potential benefit.  | Improved oversight               | FHFA Oversight of<br>Enterprise<br>Handling of Aged<br>Repurchase<br>Demands<br>( <u>AUD-2014-009</u> ,<br>February 12, 2014)  |
| Oversight of<br>Enterprise<br>Implementation of<br>Representation and<br>Warranty<br>Framework | FHFA should perform a comprehensive<br>analysis to assess whether financial risks<br>associated with the new representation and<br>warranty framework, including with regard<br>to sunset periods, are appropriately<br>balanced between the Enterprises and<br>sellers. This analysis should be based on<br>consistent transactional data across both<br>Enterprises, identify potential costs<br>and benefits to the Enterprises, and<br>document consideration of the Agency's<br>objectives. | Improved framework<br>management | FHFA's<br>Representation<br>and Warranty<br>Framework (AUD-<br><u>2014-016</u> ,<br>September 17,<br>2014)   |
| Seller/Servicer<br>Compliance with<br>Guidance   | FHFA should direct Fannie Mae and Freddie<br>Mac to assess the cost/benefit of a risk-<br>based approach to requiring their sellers<br>and servicers to provide independent, third-<br>party attestation reports on compliance with<br>Enterprise origination and servicing<br>guidance.   | Improved compliance              | FHFA's Oversight of<br>Risks Associated<br>with the<br>Enterprises Relying<br>on Counterparties<br>to Comply with<br>Selling and<br>Servicing<br>Guidelines (AUD-<br>2014-018,<br>September 26,<br>2014) |
| Collection of Funds<br>from Servicers  | FHFA should publish Fannie Mae's reduction targets and overpayment findings.   | Improved transparency            | Evaluation of<br>Fannie Mae's<br>Servicer<br>Reimbursement<br>Operations for<br>Delinquency<br>Expenses (EVL-<br>2013-012,<br>September 18,<br>2013)   |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated                     | Recommendation  | Expected Impact     | Report Name and<br>Date   |
|--|---|---------------------|---|
| Examination<br>Recordkeeping<br>Practices            | DER should adopt a comprehensive<br>examination workpaper index and<br>standardize electronic workpaper folder<br>structures and naming conventions<br>between the two Core Teams. In addition,<br>FHFA and DER should upgrade<br>recordkeeping practices as necessary to<br>enhance the identification and retrieval of<br>critical workpapers.  | Improved efficiency | Evaluation of the<br>Division of<br>Enterprise<br>Regulation's 2013<br>Examination<br>Records:<br>Successes and<br>Opportunities (EVL-<br>2015-001, October<br>6, 2014)           |
| Oversight of<br>Enterprise Executive<br>Compensation | FHFA should develop a strategy to enhance<br>the Executive Compensation Branch's<br>capacity to review the reasonableness and<br>justification of the Enterprises' annual<br>proposals to compensate their executives<br>based on Corporate Scorecard<br>performance. To this end, FHFA should<br>ensure that: the Enterprises submit<br>proposals containing information sufficient<br>to facilitate a comprehensive review by the<br>Executive Compensation Branch; the<br>Executive Compensation Branch tests and<br>verifies the information in the Enterprises'<br>proposals, perhaps on a randomized basis;<br>and the Executive Compensation Branch<br>follows up with the Enterprises to resolve<br>any proposals that do not appear to be<br>reasonable and justified. | Improved oversight  | Compliance Review<br>of FHFA's Oversight<br>of Enterprise<br>Executive<br>Compensation<br>Based on<br>Corporate<br>Scorecard<br>Performance (COM-<br>2016-002, March<br>17, 2016) |
|  | FHFA should develop a policy under which it<br>is required to notify OIG within 10 days of its<br>decision not to fully implement,<br>substantially alter, or abandon a corrective<br>action that served as the basis for OIG's<br>decision to close a recommendation.  | Improved oversight  | Compliance Review<br>of FHFA's Oversight<br>of Enterprise<br>Executive<br>Compensation<br>Based on<br>Corporate<br>Scorecard<br>Performance (COM-<br>2016-002, March<br>17, 2016) |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated                  | Recommendation  | Expected Impact  | Report Name and<br>Date  |
|---|---|--|--|
|   | FHFA should re-assess the appropriateness<br>of the annual compensation package of<br>\$3.6 million to the Fannie Mae President<br>with consideration paid to the following<br>factors: the congressional intent behind the<br>statutory cap on compensation; Fannie<br>Mae's continued conservatorship status<br>and the burdens imposed on the taxpayers<br>from that status; and the 10-year practice<br>at Fannie Mae where one individual<br>executed the responsibilities of both the<br>Chief Executive Officer and President<br>positions, with annual compensation<br>capped at \$600,000 since 2015.  | Improved governance                                      | FHFA's Approval of<br>Senior Executive<br>Succession<br>Planning at Fannie<br>Mae Acted to<br>Circumvent the<br>Congressionally<br>Mandated Cap on<br>CEO Compensation<br>(EVL-2019-001,<br>March 26, 2019)  |
|   | FHFA should re-assess the appropriateness<br>of the annual compensation package of<br>\$3.25 million to the Freddie Mac President<br>with consideration paid to the following<br>factors: the congressional intent behind the<br>statutory cap on compensation; Freddie<br>Mac's continued conservatorship status<br>and the burdens imposed on the taxpayers<br>from that status; the 10-year practice at<br>Freddie Mac where one individual executed<br>the Chief Executive Officer responsibilities<br>with annual compensation capped at<br>\$600,000 since 2015; and the temporary<br>nature of the position of President, in light<br>of FHFA's representation that Candidate A<br>will leave Freddie Mac if he is not selected<br>for the Chief Executive Officer position. | Improved governance                                      | FHFA's Approval of<br>Senior Executive<br>Succession<br>Planning at Freddie<br>Mac Acted to<br>Circumvent the<br>Congressionally<br>Mandated Cap on<br>CEO Compensation<br>(EVL-2019-002,<br>March 26, 2019) |
| Oversight of<br>Servicing Alignment<br>Initiative | FHFA's Division of Housing Mission and<br>Goals Deputy Director should establish an<br>ongoing process to evaluate servicers'<br>Servicing Alignment Initiative compliance<br>and the effectiveness of the Enterprises'<br>remediation efforts.   | Improved servicing<br>compliance and<br>minimized losses | FHFA's Oversight<br>of the Servicing<br>Alignment Initiative<br>( <u>EVL-2014-003</u> ,<br>February 12, 2014)  |
|   | FHFA's Division of Housing Mission and<br>Goals Deputy Director should direct the<br>Enterprises to provide routinely their<br>internal reports and reviews for the Division<br>of Housing Mission and Goals' assessment.   | Improved servicing<br>compliance and<br>minimized losses | FHFA's Oversight<br>of the Servicing<br>Alignment Initiative<br>( <u>EVL-2014-003</u> ,<br>February 12, 2014)  |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated                             | Recommendation  | Expected Impact  | Report Name and Date   |
|--|---|--|--|
|  | FHFA's Division of Housing Mission and<br>Goals Deputy Director should regularly<br>review Servicing Alignment Initiative-related<br>guidelines for enhancements or revisions,<br>as necessary, based on servicers' actual<br>versus expected performance.  | Improved servicing<br>compliance and<br>minimized losses | FHFA's Oversight<br>of the Servicing<br>Alignment Initiative<br>(EVL-2014-003,<br>February 12, 2014)   |
| Oversight of<br>Enterprise<br>Remediation of<br>Deficiencies | FHFA should review FHFA's existing<br>requirements, guidance, and processes<br>regarding MRAs against the requirements,<br>guidance, and processes adopted by the<br>Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,<br>the Board of Governors of the Federal<br>Reserve System, and other federal financial<br>regulators including, but not limited to,<br>content of an MRA; standards for proposed<br>remediation plans; approval authority for<br>proposed remediation plans; real-time<br>assessments at regular intervals of the<br>effectiveness and timeliness of an<br>Enterprise's MRA remediation efforts; final<br>assessment of the effectiveness and<br>timeliness of an Enterprise's MRA<br>remediation efforts; and required<br>documentation for examiner oversight of<br>MRA remediation. | Improved remediation<br>of deficiencies                  | FHFA's Examiners<br>Did Not Meet<br>Requirements and<br>Guidance for<br>Oversight of an<br>Enterprise's<br>Remediation of<br>Serious<br>Deficiencies (EVL-<br>2016-004, March<br>29, 2016) |
|  | Based on the results of the review in<br>recommendation 1, FHFA should assess<br>whether any of the existing requirements,<br>guidance, and processes adopted by FHFA<br>should be enhanced, and make such<br>enhancements.   | Improved remediation<br>of deficiencies                  | FHFA's Examiners<br>Did Not Meet<br>Requirements and<br>Guidance for<br>Oversight of an<br>Enterprise's<br>Remediation of<br>Serious<br>Deficiencies (EVL-<br>2016-004, March<br>29, 2016) |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated                         | Recommendation   | Expected Impact             | Report Name and<br>Date   |
|--|--|-----------------------------|---|
| Communication of<br>Deficiencies to<br>Enterprise Boards | FHFA should revise its supervision guidance<br>to require DER to provide the Chair of the<br>Audit Committee of an Enterprise Board<br>with each plan submitted by Enterprise<br>management to remediate an MRA with<br>associated timetables and the response by<br>DER.  | Improved Board<br>oversight | FHFA's Supervisory<br>Standards for<br>Communication of<br>Serious<br>Deficiencies to<br>Enterprise Boards<br>and for Board<br>Oversight of<br>Management's<br>Remediation<br>Efforts are<br>Inadequate (EVL-<br>2016-005, March<br>31, 2016)   |
|  | FHFA should revise its supervision guidance<br>to require DER to provide the Chair of the<br>Audit Committee of an Enterprise Board<br>with each conclusion letter setting forth an<br>MRA.  | Improved supervision        | FHFA's Supervisory<br>Standards for<br>Communication of<br>Serious<br>Deficiencies to<br>Enterprise Boards<br>and for Board<br>Oversight of<br>Management's<br>Remediation<br>Efforts are<br>Inadequate (EVL-<br>2016-005, March<br>31, 2016)   |
|  | <ul> <li>FHFA should direct DER to develop detailed guidance and promulgate that guidance to each Enterprise's board of directors that explains:</li> <li>The purpose for DER's annual presentation to each Enterprise board of directors on the ROE results, conclusions, and supervisory concerns and the opportunity for directors to ask questions and discuss ROE examination conclusions and supervisory concerns at that presentation; and</li> <li>The requirement that each Enterprise board of directors submit a written response to the annual ROE to DER and the expected level of detail regarding ongoing and contemplated remediation in that written response.</li> </ul> | Improved Board<br>oversight | FHFA Failed to<br>Consistently Deliver<br>Timely Reports of<br>Examination to the<br>Enterprise Boards<br>and Obtain Written<br>Responses from<br>the Boards<br>Regarding<br>Remediation of<br>Supervisory<br>Concerns Identified<br>in those Reports<br>(EVL-2016-009,<br>July 14, 2016) |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated            | Recommendation  | Expected Impact                         | Report Name and<br>Date   |
|---|---|---|---|
|   | FHFA should direct the Enterprises' boards<br>to amend their charters to require review by<br>each director of each annual ROE and<br>review and approval of the written response<br>to DER in response to each annual ROE. | Improved Board<br>oversight             | FHFA Failed to<br>Consistently Deliver<br>Timely Reports of<br>Examination to the<br>Enterprise Boards<br>and Obtain Written<br>Responses from<br>the Boards<br>Regarding<br>Remediation of<br>Supervisory<br>Concerns Identified<br>in those Reports<br>(EVL-2016-009,<br>July 14, 2016) |
| Assessing<br>Remediation of<br>Deficiencies | FHFA should ensure that the underlying<br>remediation documents, including the<br>Procedures Document, are readily available<br>by direct link or other means, through DER's<br>MRA tracking system(s).                     | Improved remediation<br>of deficiencies | FHFA's Inconsistent<br>Practices in<br>Assessing<br>Enterprise<br>Remediation of<br>Serious<br>Deficiencies and<br>Weaknesses in its<br>Tracking Systems<br>Limit the<br>Effectiveness of<br>FHFA's Supervision<br>of the Enterprises<br>(EVL-2016-007,<br>July 14, 2016)                 |
|   | FHFA should require DER to track interim<br>milestones and to independently assess<br>and document the timeliness and adequacy<br>of Enterprise remediation of MRAs on a<br>regular basis.                                  | Improved remediation<br>of deficiencies | FHFA's Inconsistent<br>Practices in<br>Assessing<br>Enterprise<br>Remediation of<br>Serious<br>Deficiencies and<br>Weaknesses in its<br>Tracking Systems<br>Limit the<br>Effectiveness of<br>FHFA's Supervision<br>of the Enterprises<br>(EVL-2016-007,<br>July 14, 2016)                 |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated | Recommendation   | Expected Impact                         | Report Name and<br>Date   |
|----------------------------------|--|---|---|
|                                  | FHFA should require the Enterprises to<br>provide, in their remediation plans, the<br>target date in which their internal audit<br>departments expect to validate<br>management's remediation of MRAs, and<br>require examiners to enter that date into a<br>dedicated field in the MRA tracking system. | Improved remediation<br>of deficiencies | FHFA's Inconsistent<br>Practices in<br>Assessing<br>Enterprise<br>Remediation of<br>Serious<br>Deficiencies and<br>Weaknesses in its<br>Tracking Systems<br>Limit the<br>Effectiveness of<br>FHFA's Supervision<br>of the Enterprises<br>(EVL-2016-007,<br>July 14, 2016)                               |
|                                  | FHFA should periodically conclude, based<br>upon sufficient examination work, on the<br>overall effectiveness of the Internal Audit<br>functions at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  | Improved remediation<br>of deficiencies | FHFA Requires the<br>Enterprises'<br>Internal Audit<br>Functions to<br>Validate<br>Remediation of<br>Serious<br>Deficiencies but<br>Provides No<br>Guidance and<br>Imposes No<br>Preconditions on<br>Examiners' Use of<br>that Validation<br>Work ( <u>EVL-2018-</u><br><u>002</u> , March 28,<br>2018) |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated   | Recommendation  | Expected Impact                         | Report Name and Date  |
|--|---|---|---|
|  | FHFA should direct that examiners can use<br>Internal Audit work to assess the adequacy<br>of MRA remediation only if FHFA has<br>concluded that the Internal Audit function is<br>effective overall.   | Improved remediation<br>of deficiencies | FHFA Requires the<br>Enterprises'<br>Internal Audit<br>Functions to<br>Validate<br>Remediation of<br>Serious<br>Deficiencies but<br>Provides No<br>Guidance and<br>Imposes No<br>Preconditions on<br>Examiners' Use of<br>that Validation<br>Work ( <u>EVL-2018-</u><br><u>002</u> , March 28,<br>2018)                                 |
| Identification of<br>Deficiencies and<br>Their Root Causes                 | FHFA should direct DER to revise its<br>guidance to require ROEs to focus the<br>boards' attention of the most critical and<br>time-sensitive supervisory concerns through<br>(1) the prioritization of examination findings<br>and conclusions and (2) identification of<br>deficiencies and MRAs in the ROE and<br>discussion of their root causes. | Improved Board<br>oversight             | FHFA's Failure to<br>Consistently<br>Identify Specific<br>Deficiencies and<br>Their Root Causes<br>in Its Reports of<br>Examination<br>Constrains the<br>Ability of the<br>Enterprise Boards<br>to Exercise<br>Effective Oversight<br>of Management's<br>Remediation of<br>Supervisory<br>Concerns (EVL-<br>2016-008, July 14,<br>2016) |
| Oversight of Fannie<br>Mae Headquarters<br>Consolidation and<br>Relocation | FHFA should ensure that it has adequate<br>internal staff, outside contractors, or both,<br>who have the professional expertise and<br>experience in commercial construction to<br>oversee the build-out plans and associated<br>budget(s), as Fannie Mae continues to<br>revise and refine them.   | Improved oversight                      | Management Alert:<br>Need for Increased<br>Oversight by FHFA,<br>as Conservator of<br>Fannie Mae, of the<br>Projected Costs<br>Associated with<br>Fannie Mae's<br>Headquarters<br>Consolidation and<br>Relocation Project<br>( <u>COM-2016-004</u> ,<br>June 16, 2016)  |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated   | Recommendation  | Expected Impact    | Report Name and<br>Date  |
|--|---|--------------------|--|
|  | FHFA should direct Fannie Mae to provide<br>regular updates and formal budgetary<br>reports to the Division of Conservatorship <sup>12</sup><br>for its review and for FHFA approval through<br>the design and construction of Fannie<br>Mae's leased space in Midtown Center.  | Improved oversight | Management Alert:<br>Need for Increased<br>Oversight by FHFA,<br>as Conservator of<br>Fannie Mae, of the<br>Projected Costs<br>Associated with<br>Fannie Mae's<br>Headquarters<br>Consolidation and<br>Relocation Project<br>( <u>COM-2016-004</u> ,<br>June 16, 2016) |
| Oversight of Fannie<br>Mae Northern<br>Virginia<br>Consolidation and<br>Relocation | To reduce the waste from Option C (the<br>option Fannie Mae selected for its future<br>operations in Northern Virginia), FHFA,<br>consistent with its duties as conservator,<br>should cause Fannie Mae to calculate the<br>net present value for a Status Quo Option,<br>and calculate the costs associated with<br>terminating the lease with Boston<br>Properties.                     | Reduced waste      | Consolidation and<br>Relocation of<br>Fannie Mae's<br>Northern Virginia<br>Workforce ( <u>OIG-</u><br><u>2018-004</u> ,<br>September 6,<br>2018)   |
|  | To reduce the waste from Option C, FHFA,<br>consistent with its duties as conservator,<br>should direct Fannie Mae to terminate the<br>lease, cancel the sale of the three owned<br>buildings, and implement the Status Quo<br>Option, should the net present value for a<br>Status Quo Option and the termination<br>costs be lower than the adjusted net<br>present value for Option C. | Reduced waste      | Consolidation and<br>Relocation of<br>Fannie Mae's<br>Northern Virginia<br>Workforce ( <u>OIG-</u><br><u>2018-004</u> ,<br>September 6,<br>2018)   |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> On January 30, 2020, FHFA's Division of Conservatorship was renamed the Division of Resolutions.

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated  | Recommendation   | Expected Impact     | Report Name and<br>Date  |
|-----------------------------------|--|---------------------|--|
| Conflicts of Interest             | Take appropriate action to address conflicts<br>of interest issue involving an entity within<br>FHFA's oversight authority. Public release<br>by OIG of certain information in the<br>Management Alert and accompanying<br>expert report is prohibited by the Privacy Act<br>of 1974 (Pub.L. 93–579, 88 Stat. 1896,<br>enacted December 31, 1974, 5 U.S.C. §<br>552a). | Improved oversight  | Administrative<br>Investigation into<br>Anonymous Hotline<br>Complaints<br>Concerning<br>Timeliness and<br>Completeness of<br>Disclosures<br>Regarding a<br>Potential Conflict of<br>Interest by a Senior<br>Executive Officer of<br>an Enterprise (OIG-<br>2017-004, March<br>23, 2017)                             |
|                                   | Take appropriate action to address conflicts<br>of interest issue involving an entity within<br>FHFA's oversight authority. Public release<br>by OIG of certain information in the<br>Management Alert and accompanying<br>expert report is prohibited by the Privacy Act<br>of 1974 (Pub.L. 93–579, 88 Stat. 1896,<br>enacted December 31, 1974, 5 U.S.C. §<br>552a). | Improved oversight  | Administrative<br>Investigation into<br>Anonymous Hotline<br>Complaints<br>Concerning<br>Timeliness and<br>Completeness of<br>Disclosures<br>Regarding a<br>Potential Conflict of<br>Interest by a Senior<br>Executive Officer of<br>an Enterprise (OIG-<br>2017-004, March<br>23, 2017)                             |
| Management of<br>Agency Resources | FHFA should determine and pay the vendor<br>the interest penalties owed under the<br>Prompt Payment Act regulations for the late<br>payments of the leased seasonal<br>decorations received by FHFA for the 2015,<br>2016, and 2017 holiday seasons.   | Improved compliance | Audit of FHFA's<br>Fiscal Year 2017<br>Government<br>Purchase Card<br>Program Found<br>Several<br>Deficiencies with<br>Leased Holiday<br>Decorations, and<br>the Need for<br>Greater Attention<br>by Cardholders and<br>Approving Officials<br>to Program<br>Requirements<br>(AUD-2018-011,<br>September 6,<br>2018) |

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated           | Recommendation   | Expected Impact                            | Report Name and<br>Date   |
|--|--|--|---|
|  | FHFA should assess the \$80,985 in costs<br>that we questioned in this report, as well as<br>any additional costs related to disincentives<br>that may have been triggered after our<br>review period. FHFA should take action to<br>recover these costs, as appropriate, and<br>enforce disincentive clauses going<br>forward. <sup>13</sup>  | Reduced costs                              | Management<br>Advisory: FHFA<br>Failed to Enforce a<br>Provision of an IT<br>Services Contract,<br>Resulting in More<br>than \$80,000 in<br>Questioned Costs<br>( <u>OIG-2020-001</u> ,<br>March 3, 2020) |
| Privacy Information<br>and Data Protection | FHFA should determine the feasibility for<br>automatically disabling inactive application<br>accounts Correspondence Tracking System<br>and Merit Central/Job Performance Plan at<br>a frequency that fits the business needs<br>and update applicable system policies and<br>procedures, as necessary.  | Improved protection of privacy information | Audit of the Federal<br>Housing Finance<br>Agency's 2019<br>Privacy Program<br>( <u>AUD-2019-009</u> ,<br>August 28, 2019)  |
|  | FHFA should implement a control at the<br>application layer to ensure inactive<br>application accounts for Correspondence<br>Tracking System and Merit Central/Job<br>Performance Plan are disabled in<br>accordance with the determined system<br>frequency. If the application does not<br>accommodate automatic disabling of<br>inactive accounts, then consider<br>implementing manual compensating<br>controls (i.e., manually reviewing and<br>disabling dormant accounts) to help<br>mitigate the risk. | Improved protection of privacy information | Audit of the Federal<br>Housing Finance<br>Agency's 2019<br>Privacy Program<br>( <u>AUD-2019-009</u> ,<br>August 28, 2019)  |
| FHFA Information<br>Technology Security    | Because information in this report could be<br>used to circumvent FHFA's internal controls,<br>it has not been released publicly.  | Improved information<br>security           | Audit of the Federal<br>Housing Finance<br>Agency's<br>Information<br>Security Program<br>Fiscal Year 2019<br>( <u>AUD-2020-001</u> ,<br>October 25, 2019)  |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> As discussed in the Management Advisory, we determined that an FHFA contractor failed to provide contractually required staffing levels for more than three months but FHFA did not seek (or obtain) a reduction in the amount owed under a disincentive clause in the contract. FHFA, while not disputing the OIG analysis of the questioned cost amount, determined that it would not pursue recovery of the questioned cost because government delays with onboarding contractor employees contributed to the contractor's failure to meet the required staffing levels.

| Specific Risk to be<br>Mitigated | Recommendation  | Expected Impact                  | Report Name and<br>Date  |
|----------------------------------|---|----------------------------------|--|
|                                  | Because information in this report could be<br>used to circumvent FHFA's internal controls,<br>it has not been released publicly.   | Improved information<br>security | Audit of the Federal<br>Housing Finance<br>Agency's<br>Information<br>Security Program<br>Fiscal Year 2019<br>( <u>AUD-2020-001</u> ,<br>October 25, 2019)   |
| Supervisory<br>Oversight         | FHFA should establish measurable<br>objectives and risk tolerances for the<br>Enterprises' 97% LTV mortgage programs,<br>such as those for acquisition volume and<br>delinquency rates, so that management can<br>better identify, analyze, and respond to<br>risks related to achieving the programs'<br>objectives. | Improved oversight               | Weaknesses in<br>FHFA's Monitoring<br>of the Enterprises'<br>97% LTV Mortgage<br>Programs May<br>Hinder FHFA's<br>Ability to Timely<br>Identify, Analyze,<br>and Respond to<br>Risks Related to<br>Achieving the<br>Programs'<br>Objectives<br>( <u>AUD-2020-014</u> ,<br>September 29,<br>2020) |

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